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The Entitlement Exclusion in
the Personal Auto Policy: The
Road to Reducing Litigation
in Permissive Use Cases
or a Dead End?
INTRODUCTION
Bill Smith holds a Personal Auto Policy with Company A which
provides coverage for himself and his family, but which contains an
entitlement exclusion clause, disallowing coverage for "any person...
[u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled
to do so."' Late one night, John Smith, the fourteen-year-old unlicensed
son of the insured, took the family's vehicle for a joyride without his
father's knowledge. After consuming several beers, John was involved in
a collision that killed two members of the Brown family. The Brown's
brought suit against Bill and John Smith requesting compensation for
personal injuries and property damages. Company A refused to indemnify
and defend Bill Smith for all claims arising out of this accident, stating
that the policy did not cover John Smith because he did not have a
reasonable belief of entitlement to use his father's vehicle.
In determining whether to grant Company A's motion for summary
judgment, the court is faced with many issues regarding the applicability
of the entitlement exclusion clause. Namely, is John Smith covered
because of his status as a family member, regardless of whether he
reasonably believed he was entitled to use the vehicle? Can he have a
reasonable belief that he was entitled to operate a vehicle as an unli-
censed and intoxicated driver? Are all of these issues important, or will
'ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, 1989 POLICY KIT FOR STUDENTS OF
INSURANCE 2A8 (1989) [hereinafter KIT].
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coverage be denied simply because he did not have his father's permis-
sion? What if John Smith had permission to operate the motor vehicle for
a specific purpose and deviated from that purpose - would that negate
his reasonable belief? What if he delegated that permission to a third
person and the third person caused the accident - would the third person
be covered?
This hypothetical demonstrates the many issues facing courts today
in construing the language of the standard personal automobile insurance
policy's entitlement exclusion clause, which excludes coverage for "any
person... [u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person
is entitled to do so."2 Although this policy language was implemented by
the Insurance Service Office3 in the late 1970s4 and has been used by
insurance companies across the country, there has been a great deal of
confusion regarding its interpretation.
The explanation behind inconsistent interpretations of the entitlement
exclusion clause can be traced back to the provisions of the traditional
omnibus clause, often referred to as the "permissive use clause," which
provided coverage for any person "provided that the actual use thereof
is with the permission of the named insured."6 The issue under the
permissive use clause was whether the owner of the vehicle gave express
or implied permission to the user to operate the vehicle; therefore, the
focus was solely on the actions of the policyholder.7
2Id.
' "The Insurance Service Office, Inc. ["ISO"] haspromulgatedmodel policies which
have been adopted as standard by many states." ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE § 3.03 (1995).
' ISO Circular, Personal Auto Policy Developed (Apr. 30, 1976), attached to
Personal Auto Policy, 1975-1976.
5 ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 409 (student ed. 1988).
6 SPENCER L. KIMBALL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAW 399 (1992).
The permissive use clause, or some form of it, has been found in insurance policies as
early as 1955. Maximilian A. Pock, Insurance, 46 MERCER L. REv. 261, 284 (1994).
The 1955 Standard Automobile Policy covers any person while using the
automobile, provided that the actual use "is with the permission of the named
insured."The 1963 Family Combination Automobile Policy is more convoluted,
if not recondite. It "covers any other person using such automobile with...
permission... provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his other
actual use thereof is with ... permission, or reasonably believed to be with...
permission... and is within the scope of such permission."
Id. (quoting JUNE M. AUSTIN & NORMAN E. RISJORD, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY
INSURANCE CASES 19 (1964)). Thereafter, the Personal Automobile Policy was enacted.
Id.
' Cooper v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 849 F.2d 496, 499 (11th Cir. 1988) ("The
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When the permission approach produced "substantial amounts of
litigation ' 8 and was criticized as being too "fact-oriented," 9 insurance
companies replaced the permissive use clause with the new entitlement
exclusion clause,'" thereby following the "general trend toward expand-
ing the scope of coverage."" Instead of focusing on permission from the
owner's perspective, 2 the entitlement exclusion clause "shifts the
inquiry from the express or implied intent of the owner to the subjective
belief of the user."' 3 Under the entitlement exclusion clause, therefore,
the issue is whether the user reasonably believes she is entitled to operate
the vehicle.
Reasonable belief "is broader in scope than the phrase 'with the
permission of' and provides a more liberal effect, favorable to cover-
age."14 Under the traditional permissive use clause, the user is only
permissive use clause focused on the owner's perspective.").
8 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 5, at 370. Diane Richardson, Assistant Editor, Fire
Casualty & SuretyBulletin, stated that the policy language was changed from permission
to reasonable belief of entitlement in response to the substantial amount of litigation
which resultedfrom thepermissionapproach. Telephone interview withDiane Richardson,
Assistant Editor, Fire Casualty & Surety Bulletin (Sept. 28, 1995).
9 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 5, at 370. "[C]overage disputes which focus on
issues which relate to permission typically involve controversies that are essentially fact-
oriented, and frequently involve substantial costs to resolve coverage questions on the
basis of subtle nuances." Id.
10 See ISO Circular, supra note 4, at 2.
The former permission requirement, i.e., the use of a vehicle with permission
and within the scope of that permission has been eliminated .... [A] new
exclusion has been added which provides that there is no coverage for a person
using a vehicle when that person does not have a reasonable belief of being
entitled to do so. This change has been made to eliminate the necessity of trying
to establish a fact situation.
Id.
In the Personal Auto Policy published by the Insurance Services Office and
used in whole or in part by many insurers, the permission requirement has been
changed from an element of coverage to an exclusion for anyone "using a
vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so."
W. Shelby McKenzie & H. Alston Johnson, Insurance, 54 LA. L. REv. 651, 653 (1994).
"KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 5, at 369.
12 Cooper v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 849 F.2d 496, 499 (11th Cir. 1988) ("The
permissive use clause focused on the owner's perspective.").
11 McKenzie & Johnson, supra note 10, at 653.
14 Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. American States Ins. Co., No. 12955, 1987 WL
13651, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 17, 1987) (citing Martie v. Epling, No. 9808, at 8 (Ohio
Ct. App. Feb. 4, 1981)). See also Kenyon v. Newton, 534 N.Y.S.2d 600, 601 (App. Div.
1988) ("This is a much broader concept than actual permission," and the language
"provides more favorable coverage.").
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covered when she has the owner's express or implied permission to
operate the vehicle;" but, under the entitlement exclusion clause, a court
can analyze all the facts and circumstances upon which the driver formed
a reasonable belief. 6 Therefore, courts may determine the driver's belief
to be reasonable even without the owner's permission) 7
Although the purpose of expanding coverage with the entitlement
language was to decrease the litigation costs which occurred under the
permission approach, 8 the entitlement exclusion has in fact produced
substantial amounts of litigation. 9 In fact, many courts have gone so far
as to state that the entitlement exclusion is "clearly ambiguous." '2
's Cooper v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 849 F.2d 496, 499 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
16 See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rynearson, 1989 WL 100408 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug.
18, 1989) (affording coverage to the defendant because the "evidence as a whole"
demonstrated that defendant was always allowed to use insured's vehicle to attend
probation appointments, that defendant and the insured socialized together, and that
defendant believed he would have been given permission to use the vehicle if the insured
had been present at the time).
7 Id. See also Royal Ins. Co. v. Messick, 1987 WL 9613 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 6,
1987); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., No. 10748, 1988 WL
79316, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 26, 1988) (stating that the entitlement exclusion "does
not require permission from a named insured or even an insured"). In RoyalInsurance Co.
v. Messickthe operator of the vehicle conceded that he did not have insured's permission
to operate the vehicle. However, the court held that a jury question still existed as to
whether or not the operator had a reasonable belief he was entitled to operate the vehicle
based on other factors such as length of relationship with insured's son and access to keys.
Royal Ins. Co., 1987 WL 9613, at *1.
"S See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
19 There have been over a hundred cases attempting to interpret the entitlement
exclusion. Search of Westlaw, Sept. 1, 1995. Although courts often refer to the Personal
Auto Policy containing the entitlement clause as the "easy reading" or "plain language"
policy, some courts disagree. In fact, one court has stated: "[I]t is more difficult to
understand than the policies written before some insurance carriers decided to make them
easier to read." Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 663 F. Supp. 548,
552 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
2 Canadian Indem. Co. v. Heflin, 727 P.2d 35, 36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). For other
cases holding that the entitlement exclusion is ambiguous, see Hartford Ins. Co. v.
Jackson, 564 N.E.2d 906 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); American States Ins. Co. v. Adair Indus.,
Inc., 576 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 700
S.W.2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Paychex, Inc. v. Covenant Ins. Co., 549 N.Y.S.2d 237
(App. Div. 1989); Preston v. Tromm, 1990 WL 61748 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1990). If
a court finds an insurance clause ambiguous, it will be construed against the drafter.
Therefore, the effect of a finding of ambiguity will be a result in favor of the insured.
"There are literally thousands of judicial opinions resolving insurance disputes in favor
of claimants on the basis that a provision of the insurance policy at issue was ambiguous
and therefore should be construed against the insurer." KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 5,
at 629.
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This Note will examine judicial interpretation of the entitlement
exclusion clause in light of the most commonly litigated issues regarding
the change from permissive use to entitlement exclusion language. Part
I illustrates the different positions courts have taken in defining "any
person" in entitlement exclusion clauses. Does it apply to family
members?" Can it extend to the insured driving a non-insured vehi-
cle?22 Part II provides the analysis courts use to determine "reasonable
belief,"23 examines whether permission is a factor in determining
reasonable belief,24 and discusses the effect permission obtained from an
authorized user has on reasonable belief,2" and whether a deviation from
the scope of permission can negate reasonable belief.26 Part I examines
whether unlicensed and intoxicated drivers can have a reasonable belief
of entitlement to operate a motor vehicle.2 7 This Note concludes that the
entitlement exclusion clause should be given its plain and unambiguous
meaning to achieve the insurance industry's goal of reducing litigation,
thereby decreasing costs to buyers of insurance.2"
I. DEFINING "ANY PERSON"
A. Does "Any Person" Include Family Members?
Insurance policies generally list the persons covered by their terms
and those specifically excluded from coverage separately.29 Covered
persons always include, at the very least, the insured and his or her
family members.3" Policies containing the traditional permissive use
clause also cover those persons using the vehicle with the insured's
permission.3" On the other hand, policies containing the entitlement
exclusion clause exclude coverage for "any person ... [u]sing a vehicle
without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so."32
2 See infra notes 29-96 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 97-132 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 142-63 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 164-87 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 188-220 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 221-72 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 273-86 and accompanying text.
29 KIT, supra note 1, at 2.
0 Id. at 2B1. The Personal Auto Policy defines family member as "a person related
to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household. This includes
a ward or foster child." Id. at IF.
31 KIMBALL, supra note 6, at 399.
32 Krr, supra note 1, at 2A8.
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A substantial amount of litigation has arisen in the courts with regard
to whether the entitlement exclusion clause applies to family members.33
More specifically, litigants debate whether a family member can be
provided coverage in one section of the insurance policy, yet be excluded
in another.34
1. Courts Not Applying the Entitlement
Exclusion Clause to Family Members
Courts in Kentucky, Illinois, New York, Ohio, and Indiana have
essentially adopted a per se rule that family members are always covered
persons, regardless of any reasonable belief of entitlement to operate the
insured's vehicle." For example, in State Auto. Mutual Insurance Co.
v Ellis,3 6 an unlicensed fourteen-year-old drove her father's vehicle,
" See infra notes 35-96 and accompanying text. Perhaps the problem with whether
the entitlement exclusion applies to family members could be solved by using language
similar to the policy in United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. National Farmers Union Property &
Casualty, 891 P.2d 538 (N.M. 1995), which states: "No person shall be considered an
insured person if that person uses a vehicle without a reasonable belief of having
permission to use the vehicle." Id. at 539. If insurance policies placed this reasonable
belief clause in the section regarding covered persons, instead ofunder exclusions, perhaps
less litigation would arise regarding ambiguity.
" An issue which may be of interest, but which is beyond the scope of this Note, is
what happens in situations where the parents are sued for negligent entrustment of a
vehicle to their minor child? Even if the exclusion applies in situations where the family
member does not have a reasonable belief, will coverage be provided based upon the fact
that the parent has been sued as a covered person? For cases confronting this issue, see
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Peninsula Ins. Co., 585 A.2d 1313 (Del. Super. Ct.
1988); Cadillac Ins. Co. v. Moore, 541 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State Auto.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. United Ohio Ins. Co., No. 86-CA-08, 1986 WL 7738 (Ohio Ct. App. July
3, 1986); Erd v. Snyder, 639 N.E.2d 525 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).
35 See infranotes 36-58 and accompanying text. Some courts have held that coverage
is afforded to family members because of statutory mandate. See Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut.
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dawkins, 551 F. Supp. 971, 972 (D.S.C. 1982) (holding unlicensed,
non-permissive user to be covered because he lived in the same household as insured)
(citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-810 (Law. Co-op. 1981)). Another example is a
Connecticut law which states: "[C]overage afforded under [the standard automobile
liability] ... policy shall apply to the named insured and relatives residing in his
household unless such person is specificallyexcluded by endorsement." Progressive Ins.
Co. v. Monroe, No. 505402, 1992 WL 91866 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 1992) (emphasis
added) (citing CoNN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-335(d) (1990)). In this case, the court found
that insured's minor son did not have a reasonable belief of entitlement to operate the
automobile; however, coverage was provided based on the statute.
36 700 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985). This is the only Kentucky case to date
interpreting the entitlement exclusion.
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without his permission, onto a highway which resulted in an accident.37
State Auto denied coverage, arguing that the daughter was excluded from
the policy for driving her father's vehicle without a reasonable belief that
she was entitled to do so.38 The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that
the policy was "ambiguous" because the daughter was clearly covered by
her status as a family member, yet could at the same time be excluded for
using the vehicle without a reasonable belief that she was entitled to do
so. 9 Construing the ambiguity in favor of the insured,4" the court held
that the insured's daughter was "clearly included in the narrow class of
'family members' who are specifically afforded coverage under the
policy,"'" and, despite the daughter's use without permission, ordered
coverage be granted.42
The Illinois Court of Appeals has also held the entitlement exclusion
clause ambiguous as it applies to family members.43 In Hartford
Insurance Co. v. Jackson, insured's unlicensed son and his friend went
for a joyride that resulted in the friend's death." The evidence was clear
that not only was the son driving his parent's vehicle without their
consent, but he was also not legally entitled to drive.45 Nevertheless, the
court, stating that the exclusion was ambiguous as applied to family
members, reversed the lower court's ruling in favor of the insurer, and
required the insurance company to provide coverage.46
371Id. at 801.38 Id.
3 Id. at 802.
4 0 Id. at 803 (citing Wolford v. Wolford, 662 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Ky. 1984)). "The
doctrine that ambiguities in contract documents are resolved against the party responsible
for the drafting is a well recognized principle of contract interpretation." KEETON &
WIDISS, supra note 5, at 628.
41 State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 700 S.W.2d at 802.42 Id. It is this author's contention that State Auto Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ellis is
a perfect example of why a substantial amount of insurance litigation in Kentucky deals
with permissive users. See MICHAEL D. RISLEY & CATHERINE M. YOUNG, AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE LAW IN KENTUCKY § 1.7 (1995). Although insurance companies added the
entitlement exclusion clause to decrease litigation, it appears that Kentucky, along with
other states, is clearly disregarding the language in an effort to afford coverage in all
circumstances. Could an unlicensed 14 year-old honestly have a reasonable belief that she
should take her parents' vehicle onto a public highway without their permission? Clearly
not, but courts are allowing such coverage under the entitlement exclusion clause.
41 Hartford Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 564 N.E.2d 906, 912 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
4Id. at 908.
41 Id. at 907-08.
46 Id. at 913. See also Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
505 N.E.2d 1334, 1337 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that a non-permissive user did not
1995-96]
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An unlicensed son was also involved in Paychex, Inc. v Covenant
Insurance Co.47 In this case, the son drove his father's car into a
building, causing considerable damage.4" After the building owner filed
suit for property damages, the court granted summary judgment in favor
of the building owner.4 9 On appeal, the New York Supreme Court
affirmed, stating that the entitlement exclusion clause was ambiguous in
its application to family members, and that this "ambiguity should be
resolved in favor of the policyholder and against the insurer."" There-
fore, one policy covered insured's unlicensed son even though he had no
reasonable belief of entitlement to operate the vehicle."
Similarly, in Preston v Tromm, the Ohio Court of Appeals held "any
person" not to include family members. 2 Thus, the insured's unlicensed
son was provided coverage based on his family member status, despite
the insured's express prohibition against the unlicensed son's use of the
vehicle.53 The court went so far as to say that "whether the [d]efendant
had permission or had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use the
insured's vehicle at the time of the accident is of no consequence" so
long as he is a family member under the policy.54
Indiana has also taken the position that the entitlement exclusion
clause is ambiguous as it applies to family members.5 In American
have a reasonable belief that he was entitled to use the car); Economy Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Kubik, 492 N.E.2d 504, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding the entitlement exclusion
clause ambiguous as applied to family members and requiring an insurance company to
provide coverage to insured's 14 year-old daughter).
47 549 N.Y.S.2d 237 (App. Div. 1989).481 Id. at 237.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 238.
"' Id. See also Kenyon v. Newton, 534 N.Y.S.2d 600, 601 (App. Div. 1988) (holding
that a non-permissive driver was a "covered person" under an "ambiguous" entitlement
exclusion clause); Electric v. Boutelle, 504 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579 (App. Div. 1986) (holding
that a passenger who depressed the accelerator without insured-driver's consent was not
covered under this clause).52 No. 9-88-31, 1990-WL 61478, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1988).531 Id. at *4.
54 Id. See also Ziegler v. Workman, No. 93-28, 1994 WL 140755 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 30, 1994); State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hawk, No. CA-6751, 1986 WL 3922 (Ohio
Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1986). It is important to note that, although family members seem to
be automatically covered, this result might be different if the family member is driving
a vehicle not owned by the insured. See Broz v. Winland, 629 N.E.2d 395 (Ohio 1994)
(applying a reasonable belief analysis where insured's daughter was driving a friend's
vehicle). See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
55 American States Ins. Co. v. Adair Indus., Inc., 576 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991). See also Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 541 N.E.2d 959, 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)
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States Insurance Co. v Adair Industries, Inc., the Indiana Court of
Appeals stated that it is reasonable to interpret "family member" and
"any person" to be "mutually exclusive" classes.56 Construing the
ambiguity in favor of the insured, 7 the court provided coverage to
insured's unlicensed brother who used the vehicle without permis-
sion. 8
2. Courts Applying the Entitlement
Exclusion Clause to Family Members
Courts in Maryland, Tennessee, North Carolina, New Jersey, Georgia,
Missouri, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Idaho have expressly applied the
entitlement exclusion clause to family members, and application of the
clause to family members can be implied in the decisions of other
states.59 The "most thorough and in-depth case on the issue"'6 of
whether the entitlement exclusion clause applies to family members can
be found in General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Perry.6
In this case, the court found that the insured's son did not have a
reasonable belief that he was entitled to operate the insured's vehicle
(dealing with similar exclusionary language for any person "without a reasonable belief
of having permission to use the auto," and holding the language ambiguous as it applies
to family members).
" Id. at 1274 (citing Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 541 N.E.2d 959, 962 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989)). "The creation of different classes by distinguishing between descriptive
terms can create an ambiguity in a contract provision, even though the words, by
themselves, are not ambiguous." Id.
7 Id. (citing Comprehensive Health Ins. Ass'n v. Dye, 531 N.E.2d 505, 507 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1988)).
58 Id. Adair Industries, Inc. is the only Indiana case to interpret the entitlement
exclusion clause. However, a similar provision was interpreted the same way in Meridian,
541 N.E.2d at 961 (holding a child driving parent's car without permission covered under
the family policy).
'9 The rule that the entitlement exclusion clause applies to family members can be
said to have been impliedly adopted in some states based on the fact that the courts
discuss reasonable belief even though the operator of the vehicle was a family member.
For example, in RIT Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 401 N.W.2d 228 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986),
insured's son was involved in an accident while driving the family's vehicle without
permission. Id. at 229. The court did not find the son's status as a family member
determinative, but stated that whether the son had a reasonable belief that he was entitled
to operate insured's vehicle was a jury question. Id. at 230. Therefore, it can be implied
that the law in Iowa is that the entitlement exclusion applies to family members.
60 Omaha Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 866 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1993).
61 541 A.2d 1340 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
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because he was unlicensed and did not have his parents' permission.62
Because this was a case of first impression in Maryland,63 the court
conducted a thorough examination of cases from other jurisdictions which
had interpreted the clause.' After considering the "facts and circum-
stances of the parties at the time of execution"65 of the insurance
contract, the court held that the exclusionary clause was unambiguous,
concluded that family members could be excluded from coverage, and
denied coverage for insured's son because he used the vehicle without a
reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so.66
Other jurisdictions have relied on Perry and its detailed analysis. For
example, the Tennessee Court of Appeals, in Omaha Property &
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Johnson, also held the entitlement exclusion
clause unambiguous.67 The court denied coverage for a policyholder's
unlicensed son who took the car out in the middle of the night despite an
express prohibition against doing so."6 North Carolina has also been
persuaded by the decision in Perry.69 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina in Newell v Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., reversing a
lower court decision to provide coverage,7" held that the entitlement
exclusion clause can apply to family members and denied coverage to
insured's unlicensed son who was expressly prohibited from operating the
vehicle.7
62 Id. at 1341.631d. at 1342.
4 Id. at 1343-49.
65 Id. at 1342.661 d. at 1350. This is the only Maryland case to date interpreting the entitlement
exclusion clause.
67 866 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
6 Id. at 541. See also Phillips v. Harding, 1990 WL 14020 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16,
1990) (holding that "any person includes anyone who might be included under any
provision of the policy" and, therefore, denying coverage to insured's son using the
vehicle without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so); United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n v. Continental Ins. Co., 1985 WL 4692, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1985)
(holding that a "reasonable belief" existed to use the car because the insured's son gave
the driver express permission).
69 432 S.E.2d 284 (N.C. 1993) (stating that the court was persuaded by the "well-
reasoned" decision of General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Perry).
70Id. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the court of appeals decision,
which held insured's son entitled to coverage based on his family member status. For the
appellate decision see Newell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 423 N.E.2d 525 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1991).
7' Newell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 432 S.E.2d 284 (N.C. 1993). Cf. Wilson v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 394 S.E.2d 807 (N.C. 1990) (holding that the entitlement
exclusion clause does not apply to spouses living in the household with the insured)
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Although not relying on Perry, Saint Paul Insurance Co. v. Rutgers
Casualty Insurance Co. also reversed a lower court decision giving
coverage to a family member regardless of reasonable belief." In this
case, the insured's unlicensed son was instructed to wash insured's car,
but instead took the vehicle for a drive and collided with another
vehicle.73 The New Jersey Superior Court held that the exclusionary
clause was "plain and unambiguous" and that the unlicensed son was not
covered by virtue of his family member status.74 Instead, the court said
that a material issue of fact existed as to whether the son had a reason-
able belief that he was entitled to operate his mother's vehicle.75
Georgia courts have also taken the position that "[i]t is clear 'any
person' means just that .... Any person include[s] the named insured or
family members of the named insured. 76 In Cincinnati Insurance Co.
v. Plummer,77 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that an unlicensed
daughter did not have a reasonable belief of entitlement after she took the
family vehicle "for a 4:00 a.m. frolic and jaunt throughout the neighbor-
hood in defiance of [her parents'] earlier express prohibition., 7 1 The
court stated: "'[A]ny person using a vehicle without a reasonable belief
that that person is entitled to do so' applies to a family member of the
named insured."'7 9
Missouri courts have also followed this interpretation. In Driskill v.
American Family Insurance Co., 0 the insured's fifteen-year-old unli-
(citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (1991)).
7' 557 A.2d 1052 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
73 Id. at 1053.
74 Id. at 1054-55.
7S Id. See also Campbell v. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 637
A.2d 226, 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (holding that a family member needs a
reasonable belief of entitlement to drive insured's car).
76 Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 350 S.E.2d 325,
326 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). In this case, the driver, the insured's cousin who lived in the
same household with insured, was held not to have a reasonable belief that he was entitled
to use insured's vehicle and was not provided coverage, regardless of his family member
status.
7; 444 S.E.2d 378 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
78 Id. at 380, 381. Cf. Safeway Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 390 S.E.2d 52 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989) (holding coverage provided where insured's unlicensed daughter had express
permission to drive the vehicle).
79 CincinnatiIns. Co., 444 S.E.2d at 380; see Omni Ins. Co. v. Harps, 396 S.E.2d
66 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Robertson v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 286 S.E.2d 305
(Ga. Ct. App. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Grange Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Brinkley, 355 S.E.2d 767, 767 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). Robertson appears to be the very first
case reported interpreting the entitlement exclusion. Search of Westlaw, Sept. 30, 1995.
" 698 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Mo. 1988).
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censed son took the vehicle without permission, and allegedly lost control
of the vehicle, which resulted in injuries to a young boy standing in his
driveway.8' Despite the driver's family member status, the court ruled
that he was excluded from coverage for operating the vehicle without a
reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so.
82
Oregon has also refused to ignore the entitlement exclusion when
family members are involved.83 In Harlan v Valley Insurance Co., the
Oregon Court of Appeals held that insured's daughter was subject to an
exclusionary clause which denied coverage to any person using a vehicle
without the reasonable belief that she is entitled to do so, despite her
family member status.84
Likewise, in Kelly v Threshermen's Mutual Insurance Co.,85 the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not end the inquiry with whether or not
the driver was a covered person. 6 The court, in granting the insurer's
motion for summary judgment, stated: "Inclusion within a general grant
of coverage does not necessarily take one outside the breadth of
particular exclusions to coverage."87 Therefore, the entitlement exclu-
sion clause applied to the insured's unlicensed daughter using
insured's vehicle without a reasonable belief that she was entitled to do
SO.8 Finally, in Allied Group Insurance Co. v Allstate Insurance
Co.,9 the Supreme Court of Idaho held the entitlement exclusion
8I Id. at 790.
8 2 Id. at 793. See also Omaha Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 865 S.W.2d
789, 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that an unrelated driver was not covered because
he only had permission from insured's son, and thus did not have a reasonable belief);
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 768 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding driver covered by policy because of implied permission to drive car).
83 Harlan v. Valley Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 471 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).84 Id. at 473. This is the only Oregon case to date interpreting the entitlement
exclusion.
5 No. 92-2570, 1993 WL 98770 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 1993).
16zd. at *1.
17 Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 389 N.W.2d 838 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1986)). In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kelly, the court interpreting a similar
policy, stated: "From a reading of the ... policy, it is obvious that the definition of
'insured person' includes relatives." Thus, Kelly is presumably covered. It is equally
obvious, however, that coverage is denied if a presumably insured person "uses a vehicle
without having a sufficient reason to believe that use is with permission." Id. at 840. See
also Estate of Ge Yang v. General Casualty Co., No. 93-2835, 1994 WL 269281, at *1
(Wis. Ct. App. June 21, 1994) ("An insurance contract is construed from the standpoint
ofwhat an ordinary person would believe the contract to mean. An ordinary person would
believe the term 'any person' is all inclusive.").
88 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 389 N.W.2d at 840.
89 852 P.2d 485 (Idaho 1993).
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clause unambiguous and applied it to family members, basing its decision
on a determination of whether the child had permission to use the
vehicle."
3. Alternative Positions
The Louisiana Courts of Appeals are in a state of conflict with regard
to whether the entitlement exclusion applies to family members. The First
Circuit has taken the position that the exclusion does not apply to family
members, and the Second Circuit has taken the position it does apply to
family members.
In United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Dunn,91 the court held the
entitlement exclusion clause ambiguous and provided coverage for
family members who used insured's vehicle without permission because
the policy covered family members under one clause, but excluded
them under the entitlement exclusion clause.9" The court stated that
the "insurer cannot extend coverage in one clause of the policy and
then exclude coverage of the same person in another clause of the
policy. 9
3
On the other hand, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange,94 the court took the position that the
entitlement exclusion clause may exclude family members if they do not
have at least a reasonable belief of permission.95 Based on this analysis,
the court held that the clause barred coverage when insured's fourteen-
year-old grandson wrecked the car he had taken without permission.96
It is unclear how the Louisiana Supreme Court would resolve this differ-
ence.
9 Id. at 487. Interpretation of this case has caused some confusion because it
specifically notes that the entitlement exclusion clause "clearly excludes family members
who are driving the vehicle without a reasonable belief of permission." Id. However, the
court held the exclusion unenforceable because it violated an Idaho statute requiring the
insurance policy to provide coverage to any person using the insured's vehicle with the
express or implied permission of the insured. Id. In addition, some confusion arises from
the fact that this court appears to refer to reasonable belief and express and implied
permission as two distinct classes, when in fact, one encompasses the other.
9' 598 So. 2d 1169 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
92 Id. at 1169.
93 Id.
94 600 So. 2d 106 (La. Ct. App. 1992).95 Id. at 108-09.96 1d. at 107.
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B. Does "Any Person" Include the Insured Driving a Non-owned
Vehicle?
Under policies that included the traditional permissive use clause,
coverage was provided to the insured and to persons using the vehicle
with the permission of the named insured.97 Therefore, because the
focus was on the insured, the named insured was always provided
coverage regardless of which vehicle he drove.98
Under the entitlement exclusion clause, however, coverage is
excluded for "any person ... [u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable
belief that that person is entitled to do so."99 Therefore, when courts are
confronted with an entitlement exclusion clause, the issue of whether the
phrase "any person" can apply to the named insured may arise.
For example, in Lightning Rod Mutual Insurance Co. v Ray,' an
employee took his employer's vehicle without a reasonable belief that he
was entitled to do so."' The employee drove the vehicle down a rough
road, lost control and plunged 200 feet down a cliff, killing his passen-
ger.12 Nationwide Insurance, the employer's insurance provider,
claimed it was not required to provide coverage because the employee
was not authorized to use the vehicle.0 3 The employee's own vehicle
was covered under a policy with Lightning Rod. 10 4 Therefore, the court
was faced with the issue of whether Lightning Rod was required to
provide coverage while its insured was operating a vehicle not owned by
the insured.'0 5 The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the employee was
not covered under either insurance policy because he did not have a
reasonable belief of entitlement to operate his employer's vehicle.
10 6
Another case considering whether the insured can be excluded from
coverage for using a non-owned vehicle without a reasonable belief that
he was entitled to do so is Canadian Insurance Co. v Ehrlich.10 7 In this
case, the insured's son took his father's truck, which was not covered
under the family's policy, without his father's permission, and collided
9 KIMBALL, supra note 6, at 399.
9 LONG, supra note 3, § 3.03[2].
9 KIT, supra note 1, at 2A8.00 No. 91-L-073, 1992 WL 192457 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 1992).
1o1 Id. at *1.
102 id.
103 Id. at *5.
104 Id. at *2.
105 Id.
106 2.
1o0 280 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Ct. App. 1991).
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with a tree, killing one passenger and injuring two others.' The issue
presented to the court was whether an insured, while driving a non-
covered vehicle without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so,
can nevertheless be provided coverage. 9 The California Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the insurer, stating that although the son was a covered person, he was
excluded since he used the non-owned vehicle without a reasonable belief
that he was entitled to do so."0
A contrary view was expressed in Safeco Insurance Co. v Diaz,"'
where the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the "exclusionary
clause which denies liability coverage to the named insured [for
using a vehicle without permission] conflicts with [the No-Fault Act]
and is void.""' 2 In Diaz, Safeco's insured operated his brother's vehi-
cle without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so."3
When he was involved in an accident his insurance company, Safeco,
brought a declaratory judgment action, stating that the driver fell
within the entitlement exclusion."4 The trial court granted Safeco's
motion for summary judgment on the ground that Safeco was not
required to provide coverage for its insured while he operated a non-
owned vehicle without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do
SO."15
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for several reasons."' First, the court said a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether the insured had a reasonable
belief of entitlement to operate the vehicle."7 Second, and more
importantly, the court stated that "this exclusionary clause which denies
"I Id. at 142.
109 Id.
I 'ld. at 146.
" 385 N.W.2d 845 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
"
2Id. at 849. Approximately half the states have "mandated [by statute] that some
form ofno-fault coverage be included in automobile or motor vehicle insurance policies."
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 5, at 412. The idea behind these statutes is "that an injured
party should be reimbursed without regard to his fault." ROBERT H. JERRY, II,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 658 (1987).
"' 385 N.W.2d at 846. The insuredhad his own car, but his brother had left town and
he "just wanted to drive his [brother's] car" even though he knew he was not to use it
without permission. Id.
114 Id. at 845-46.
15 Id. at 846.
116Id.
"' Id. at 848.
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liability coverage to the named insured conflicts with the purposes of the
Minnesota No-Fault Act... and is void.""1
8
C. Any Person Means Any Person - Including Family Members,
Insureds, or Thd Parties
Inconsistent interpretations of the entitlement exclusion, particularly
the issue of who is "any person," demonstrates the difficulty courts have
had in interpreting the clause. It is this author's contention that the
entitlement exclusion clause is unambiguous with regard to the "any
person" language and can be simplified by using the following two prong
analysis:
1) whether the driver at issue is a covered person under the terms of
the policy;
2) whether an exclusion applies.
Although this may appear to be a common sense approach, it is not
the approach followed by some courts."9 For example, in State Auto
v Ellis,121 the court found the fact that the insured's daughter was a
family member determinative of the issue of coverage.' 2 ' However,
ending the inquiry there ignores the terms of the insurance policy.'22 An
118 Id. at 849 (citing MINN. STAT. § 65B.41-71 (1984 & Supp. 1985)). See also
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Westenfield, No. C5-92-792, 1993 WL 3853, at *1-3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Mar. 16, 1993) (Relying on Diaz, the court stated that applying the entitlement
exclusion to the named insured under the policy was contrary to Minnesota's No-Fault Act
where the insured, a passenger in a non-owned vehicle, grabbed the steering wheel,
thereby causing an accident. The injured parties filed claims with the insured's automobile
and homeowner's insurance companies, but the insurance company denied coverage for
using a vehicle without a reasonable belief of entitlement to do so.), rev'd, 496 N.W.2d
410, 410 (Minn. 1993) (stating that the lower court had "confused and therefore
misapplied principles of No-Fault first-party coverage").
,19 Cf supra notes 35-58 and accompanying text (stopping the inquiry with the issue
of whether one was a family member).
120 700 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
121 Id. at 802-03. See also Hartford Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 564 N.E.2d 906, 912 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (finding "any person" ambiguous); American States Ins. Co. v. Adair
Industries, Inc., 576 N.E.2d 1272, 1274-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the terms
"family member" and "any person" were separate, distinct, and mutually exclusive);
Paychex, Inc. v. Covenant Ins. Co., 549 N.Y.S.2d 237 (App. Div. 1989) (stating that a
"family member" was still a "covered person" even without a reasonable belief of
permission to drive the vehicle); Preston v. Tromm, No. 9-88-31, 1990 WL 61748, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1990) (stating that since the driver was a family member,
whether or not he had permission to drive was of no consequence).
12 See Harlan v. Valley Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 471, 473 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). The
Personal Auto Policy covers "[y]ou or any 'family member.' "KT, supra note 1, at 2BI.
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insurance policy, like any other contract "must be read as a whole."''
"[R]efusal to consider the exclusions as 'terms of the insurance policy'
leads to [an] absurd result."' 4 As stated by one judge, "I do not believe
that even if [the insured's unlicensed's son] were found to be a resident
that he would thereby automatically always have consent, express or
implied, of the owner, his father, to operate a vehicle. This would indeed
be an extremely dangerous precedent to set.'
25
Problems also arise in those courts which go on to the second prong
to analyze the entitlement exclusion clause and determine who is "any
person." For example, it has long been the rule that "[i]f the words of a
policy can reasonably be given their plain, ordinary, and popular
meaning, the provisions should be applied as written, and the parties
should be bound by the agreement they made."' 26 The issue thus turns
on the plain meaning of "any person"? Is it truly ambiguous?
What is the "plain, ordinary, and popular meaning' ' 2  of "any"?
Webster's New World Dictionary defines "any" as "one, no matter which
... or what kind ... without limit ... every.' 28 Next, what is a
"person"? Webster's New World Dictionary defines "person" as "a
human being ... individual man, woman or child.' 29 When taken
together, "any person" means "every man, woman or child without limit."
To put this in context, what would one suppose the phrase "any
person" means to the average listener if an announcer broadcast over the
radio "any person who comes to the station right now will win a
thousand dollars?" In that situation, the listener would perceive the phrase
"any person" to mean "every man, woman or child without limit." Yet,
in the interpretation of insurance policies this phrase somehow becomes
ambiguous to some courts. 3 It is this author's contention, and the
position stated by some courts,' that the phrase "any person" means
Yet, coverage is not provided for "any person... [u]sing a vehicle without a reasonable
belief that that person is entitled to do so." Id. at 2A8.
"7a Id. (citing Hoffman Constr. Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 836 P.2d 703 (Or. 1992)).
124 Id.
11 Newell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 403 S.E.2d 525, 530 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(Lewis, J., dissenting), rev'd, 432 S.E.2d 284 (N.C. 1993). The North Carolina Supreme
Court followed this dissenting opinion in reversing the appellate decision.
126 Hartford Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 564 N.E.2d 906, 909 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (citing Dora
Township v. Indiana Ins. Co., 400 N.E.2d 921 (Ill. 1980)).
'
2 7 Id. (citing Dora Township, 400 N.E.2d at 921).
128 WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 62 (3d college ed. 1988).
29 d. at 1008.
'
30 See supra notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 59-96 and accompanying text.
1995-961
KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
any person, including family members, insureds or third parties. If the
insurance company had intended otherwise, the policy would state "any
person but the persons listed above," or "any person but family mem-
bers. ' 132
II. WHAT IS REASONABLE BELIEF?
A. Judicial Determination of Reasonable Belief
In some cases, it is clear that the driver of the vehicle could not
possibly have had a reasonable belief that she was entitled to use the
particular vehicle at issue. For example, in one case, a man "hit [one of
the owners] in the jaw and took the [car], 133 and in another case, a
driver "pled guilty to theft" of the insured vehicle. 134 However, the
majority of cases are not so clear. As a result, in General Accident Fire
& Life Assurance Corp. v Perry,13 the court developed the following
two-pronged test for analyzing reasonable belief: (1) whether the driver
had a subjective belief that she was entitled to use the car, and (2)
whether this belief was reasonable. 13
6
132 Most policies state that "[t]his exclusion does not apply to a family member using
your covered auto." See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Davis, 721 P.2d 550, 551 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986).
'3 Lee v. General Accident Ins. Co., 738 P.2d 516, 517 (N.M. 1987). See also
Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 505 N.E.2d 1334 (I11. App.
Ct. 1987) (holding that when an angry and intoxicated driver knocked the insured down
and took the keys from her pocket, the driver did not have a reasonable belief of
entitlement to operate insured's vehicle).
134 McCraney v. Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 357 S.E.2d 327, 328 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
See also Campbell v. New Jersey Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 637 A.2d 226 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (applying the entitlement exclusion to a driver who had stolen
insured's vehicle). But seeBuckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Carrell, 602 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1991) (entitlement exclusion did not apply when the vehicle was stolen). In this
case, the insured used car lot's employee went with the driver and the driver's friend so
that they could test drive an automobile from insured's used car lot. Id. at 306. The two
men stole the vehicle by assaulting the insured used car lot's employee and "shov[ing]
him into the trunk." Id. The used car lot's employee sought employer's coverage with
Buckeye. Id. Buckeye denied coverage under the entitlement exclusion clause since the
vehicle had been stolen. Id. at 307. Yet, the court stated that since the driver had the
initial permission of insured to operate the vehicle, the entitlement exclusion clause did
not apply. Id.
1 541 A.2d 1340 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
'
36 Id. at 1350. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Trust Co., 330 S.E.2d 443,
445 (Ga. App. Ct. 1985), where the Georgia Court developed the following objective test
to determine reasonable belief:
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First, it must be positively established that the driver actually believed
that she was entitled to use the vehicle.' If this is not established, then
the conclusion must be that the driver had no reasonable belief.' 8 If it
is established that the driver actually believed that she was entitled to use
the vehicle, then the court examines whether this actual belief was
"reasonable."'3 9 In analyzing the reasonableness of a driver's belief,
many factors are important, including:
(1) Whether the driver had express permission to use the vehicle;
(2) whether the driver's use of the vehicle exceeded the permission
granted;
(3) whether the driver was "legally" entitled to drive under the
laws of the applicable state;
(4) whether the driver had any ownership or possessory right to the
vehicle;
(5) whether there was some form of relationship between the driver
and the insured, or one authorized to act on behalf of the insured, that
would have caused the driver to believe [she] was entitled to drive the
vehicle. 4 '
Other factors may be important as well, such as "'the borrower's age,
personality, and social milieu, and the effect of such attendant influences
on his judgment and mind as may be credibly discerned from the
proofs.' 1)141
The use of the term "reasonable belief" in the exclusionary clause provides
an objective standard .... From the language of the clause it is clear that
coverage is excluded if the driver (a) knew he was not entitled to drive the
vehicle, or (b) if he claimed he believed he was entitled to drive the vehicle, but
was without reasonable grounds for such belief or claim.
See also Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ayer Elec., Inc., Nos. C-920406, C-920788, C-920825,
1993 WL 538997, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1993) ("[B]oth subjective and objective
factors, including the driver's actual belief and the reasonableness of that belief based
upon the surrounding circumstances as shown by the evidence" must be taken into
consideration (citing Blount v. Kennard, 612 N.E.2d 1268 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Bush
v. Baldwin, No. 9-89-62, 1991 WL 117249 (Ohio Ct. App. June 20, 1990); Bowen v.
Price, No. 83AP-541, 1984 WL 5906 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1984))); United Servs.
Auto. Ass'n v. Continental Ins. Co., 1985 WL 4692, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
,37 See United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 1985 WL 4692, at *4.
138Id.
139 id.
140 Peny, 541 A.2d at 1350.
'4' State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 544 A.2d 1017, 1022 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (Montemuro, J., concurring in part and dissentingin part) (quoting Millerv. United
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B. Permission as a Factor in Determining Reasonable Belief
Under the permissive use clause, the focus was on whether or not the
owner of the vehicle had expressly or impliedly given the driver
permission to operate the vehicle. 142 Since the entitlement clause has
replaced the permissive use clause,'43 the issue arises as to whether
permission is still relevant in an entitlement exclusion clause analysis.
Some courts ignore the reasonable belief language entirely and focus
solely on whether the user of the vehicle had the express or implied
permission of the owner. 144 On the other hand, some courts have stated
that express or implied permission from the owner is no longer relevant,
and instead focus on the reasonable belief of the user.145 Other courts
state that permission is relevant, but not conclusive, in determining the
existence of reasonable belief.
46
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v Safeco Insurance Co.147 is among
the cases where the court focused solely on permission, ignoring the
reasonable belief language entirely. In this case, the Missouri Court of
Appeals, in interpreting the entitlement exclusion clause, stated:
"[T]he crucial issue is whether [the driver] had permission to use the
[vehicle].' 148 Likewise, in Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Heflin,149 the
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 28 Pa. D. & C.3d 389 (1983)).
142 Cooper v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 849 F.2d 496, 499 (11th Cir. 1988) ("The
permissive use clauses focused on the owner's perspective.").
,43 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text. See also Fisher v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 586 A.2d 783, 791 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (comparing the
entitlement exclusion clause with the permissive use clause and stating that the driver's
permission to drive the vehicle is irrelevant under the entitlement exclusion clause, and
instead focusing solely on whether the driver had a reasonable belief that he was entitled
to operate the vehicle).
146 See infra notes 160-63.
14' 768 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
141 Id. at 603. In this case, employee had taken employer's van, without his permission, for
a "pleasure excursion," began drinking alcohol, slept in the van, began drinking again the next
day, and continued to drive which ended in a five car collision. Id. The Missouri Court of
Appeals, focusing solely on permission, found that the driver had implied permission at the time
of the accident based on driver's prior use of the automobile. Id. at 604. A "reasonable belief'
analysis was not performed. See also Canadian Ins. Co. v. Ehrlich, 280 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Ct. App.
1991) (stating that "entitled" means basically the same thing as "permit," therefore, for an
operator of a vehicle to have a reasonable belief of entitlement to operate a vehicle, she must
have legal title or permission from the owner).
149 727 P.2d 35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
[Vol. 84
THE ENTITLEMENT ExcLusIoN CLAUSE
Arizona Court of Appeals stated that the entitlement exclusion clause's
focus was on whether or not the driver of the vehicle had the permission
of the apparent owner, and that other facts in determining reasonable
belief were irrelevant.'50 In Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Dunn,'51 the
Ohio Court of Appeals stated: "[T]he test is whether [the driver] actually
and reasonably believed that he had the owner's consent."' 52
On the other hand, some courts focus solely on the reasonable belief
of the operator, regardless of permission. As stated in Bowen v.
Price:'53 "Even if plaintiff were without express or implied permission
to use the ... [vehicle] at the time of the accident, coverage would still
be afforded ... unless it is proved that plaintiff did not have a reasonable
belief that she was entitled to use the vehicle at that time."'
154
An illustration of the view that permission is no longer controlling
can be found in United States Fire Insurance Co. v United Service
Automobile Ass'n,'55 where the passenger grabbed the steering wheel
of the vehicle, causing it to leave the road.' 56 Insurer argued that the
passenger did not have permission to grab the steering wheel and was
therefore not covered.'57 However, the court stated that the issue was
reasonable belief, not permission. 58 Because the insurer did not suc-
cessfully disprove the driver's reasonable belief that such an event might
occur, the court allowed coverage."'
Although some courts have taken the position that as long as the
driver has the reasonable belief that she is entitled to use the vehicle and
that express and implied permission are irrelevant, the majority of courts
still view permission as an important factor in determining reasonable
'
50 Id. at 36-37. In this case, which was apparently a case of first impression in
Arizona, the insurance company had filed a declaratory judgment action requesting that
the trial court determine that an underaged, unlicensed driver fell within the policy
exclusion for using the vehicle without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so.
Id. at 35. The court did not take other factors, such as lack of a license and the fact the
driver was underaged, into consideration in determining reasonable belief. In fact, the
court found this clause "ambiguous" and focused solely on whether the apparent owner
of the vehicle had consentedto driver's use of the vehicle. The court, therefore, found that
the policy covered the driver. Id.
,5, No. 13843, 1989 VTL 16893 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1989).
152Id. at *2.
,
53 No. 83AP-451, 1984 WL 5906 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1984).
'
54 Id. at *4.
,' 772 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
,
56 Id. at 220.
157 Id. at 223.
158 Id. at 223-24.
"
9Id. at 224.
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belief.6 ° As stated in General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp.
v Perty,'6' one of the factors in determining whether a driver's belief
was reasonable is "whether the driver had express permission to use the
vehicle."'62 For example, in Perry, the court took into consideration the
fact that insured's unlicensed son testified that he did not have permis-
sion to use insured's vehicle on the night in question, in denying
coverage. 163
C. Can Second Permittees Have a Reasonable Belief Even Without
the Owner's Express or Implied Permission?
Under the traditional permissive use clause, most courts have held
that "[o]rdinarily, one permittee does not have authority to select another
permittee without specific authorization from the named insured."'"
This general rule logically follows from the fact that the permissive use
clause focuses on whether the insured owner gave the driver permission
to use the automobile. 65 However, under the entitlement exclusion
clause, the issue of whether a second permittee is entitled to use insured's
vehicle is not as clear. Due to the fact that the entitlement exclusion
clause focuses on the belief of the user, the user could reasonably believe
she was entitled to use the automobile, even without express permission
from the insured.'66
For example, the Louisiana Court of Appeals in Building Specialties,
Inc. v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. '67 stated:
"
6
' See, e.g., Omaha Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 866 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1993); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Continental Ins. Co., 1985 WL 4692 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1985); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Plummer, 444 S.E.2d 378 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994); Driskill v. American Family Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Mo. 1988); Allied
Group Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 852 P.2d 485 (Idaho 1993); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 600 So. 2d 106 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Canadian Ins.
Co. v. Ehrlich, 280 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Ct. App. 1991). These are just a few of the examples
which illustrate that in determining whether driver had a reasonable belief, courts take into
consideration whether the driver had permission to operate the vehicle.
161 541 A.2d 1340 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
162 1d. at 1350.
163 1d. at 1341.
Bailey v. General Ins. Co., 144 S.E.2d 898, 900 (N.C. 1965).
165 Cooper v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 849 F.2d 496, 499 (1lth Cir. 1988) ("The
permissive use clause focused on the owner's perspective.").
166 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 1988 WL 79316, at
*4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 26, 1988) (stating that the entitlement exclusion "does not require
permission from a named insured or even an insured").
167440 S.W.2d 984, 988 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
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The contract language "reasonable belief" provided a subjective
standard regarding a determination of permission. Coverage is provided
under this language as long as the permittee reasonably believed that he
had the owner's permission, whether or not the person granting
permission had actual authority to transmit such permission.'6
Similarly, in Cooper v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,"'69 the court held: "[I]t is not unreasonable for a second permit-
tee... to assume that a first permittee ... has authority to delegate
the permission to drive when the first permittee has possession of the car
and apparent authority with respect to it.' 70 Likewise, in Canadian
Indemnity Co. v Heflin,17' the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a
second permittee had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to drive the
vehicle, because he had obtained permission from the original permit-
tee. 72
Although a second permittee could have a reasonable belief of
entitlement to use the vehicle after having obtained permission from the
authorized permittee, cases are treated differently if the second permittee
knew the insured owner prohibited others from operating the vehicle. For
example, in Dairyland Insurance Co. v. General Accident Insurance
Co., ' the second permittee, a friend of the insured's daughter, knew
of the insured's prohibition against the friend's operating the vehicle.
Nevertheless, the owner's daughter gave her friend permission to operate
the vehicle, and the two were involved in a collision.'74 Based upon
evidence that the insured's instructions were such that no one was to
operate the vehicle but the daughter, the Supreme Court of Alabama held
that the second permittee came within the exclusion by using the vehicle
without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so.
75
Similarly, in Omaha Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Peter-
son,'76 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the second permittee's
belief that she was entitled to use the vehicle was unreasonable because
she knew insured would not approve of an unlicensed person's use of the
168 d.
169 849 F.2d 496, 499 (1th Cir. 1988).
170 id.
1'' 727 P.2d 35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
172 Id. at 36.
"1 435 So. 2d 1263 (Ala. 1983).
174 Id. at 1264.
175 Id.
176 865 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
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vehicle.'" Therefore, the court ruled that, under these conditions, an
authorized permittee's consent "could not create a reasonable belief of
entitlement.' ' 78 Likewise, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Baer,179 a North Carolina Court of Appeals held that an unlicensed
driver who had been instructed by the owner of the vehicle not to drive
it falls within the category of someone using a vehicle without a
reasonable belief of entitlement to do so.181
An extreme example of how the entitlement exclusion clause analysis
focuses solely on the user can be found in United Services Automobile
Ass'n v Continental Insurance Co.,"8' where the court allowed cover-
age even though the second permittee did not have permission from the
insured-owner or the authorized user. In this case, the owner's son had
taken insured's vehicle to college with the instructions that no one else
was to operate the vehicle.'82 Without the son's knowledge, his friend
drove the insured's vehicle to a pub to drink beer.'83 After leaving the
pub, the son's friend drove to another friend's apartment to drink more
beer.'84 On the way home, the friend struck a telephone pole and
injured a passenger in the vehicle.' The court found that the son's
friend had a reasonable belief of entitlement to operate insured's vehicle
despite the facts that he did not have permission and that he was
intoxicated.'86 The finding of reasonable belief was based upon the fact
that "it was an accepted practice at the University to allow friends to
drive your automobile."'
8 7
177 Id. at 790.
178 Id. at 791. Authorized permittee told second permittee, "Be careful, don't let my
mother see [you]." Id. at 790.
17' 439 S.E.2d 202 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
80 Id. at 205.
181 1985 WL 4692 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1985).
182Id. at *5.
183 Id.
184 id.
185 id.
"1Id. at *5-6.
187 Id. at *5. ButseeBushv. Baldwin, No. 9-89-62, 1991 WL 117249 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 20, 1991), where insured gave her daughter a car to take to Ohio University,
instructing her not to allow others to use the vehicle. Id. at *1. Without the daughter's
knowledge, her intoxicated friend took the insured's vehicle and was involved in an
accident. Id. In this case, the court did not speak of any custom to allow friends to use
insured's automobile at the university, nor was the fact that insured's daughter and driver
were friends controlling. Id. at *3. The court held that driver did not have a reasonable
belief of entitlement to operate insured's vehicle. Id. at *4.
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D. Can Deviation From the Scope of Permission Negate a Driver's
Reasonable Belief?
In automobile insurance policies that use the entitlement exclusion
clause, a question arises when a driver had the initial reasonable belief
that she was entitled to use the vehicle for a specific purpose, then
deviates from that purpose. Does a deviation from the scope of that
entitlement in effect nullify the reasonable belief?
Under the traditional permissive use clause, deviation from the scope
of entitlement was analyzed solely by the extent the driver deviated from
the original scope of permission given by the owner.' In fact, some
permissive use clauses made specific reference to the scope of permission
granted.8 9 By contrast, the entitlement exclusion clause shifts the focus
to the user's belief.'90 The issue thus becomes whether the user of the
automobile reasonably believed that he was entitled to use the vehicle in
such a manner as to deviate from the scope. Therefore, under the
entitlement exclusion clause, the extent of the permission granted by the
owner to the user is but one factor in determining the user's reasonable
belief.'9'
In analyzing the deviation from scope issue, some courts find the
deviation alone sufficient to exclude the driver from coverage. For
example, in Roberts v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,'92 the
Florida Court of Appeals held that when a driver, who had been
authorized to use the vehicle to the extent necessary to repair it, made a
trip to the beach, he went beyond the scope of the purpose for which he
"'. See Moritz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 739 P.2d 731, 734 (Wash. Ct. App.
1987) (setting out the three approaches to interpreting the permissive use clause, all of
which focus on the deviation in the context of the extent of permission given by the
owner).
"89 See United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Larsen, 723 P.2d 8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
In this case, the court stated that United Pacific had used the standard omnibus clause
language in the past, but decided to change to the entitlement exclusion clause. Therefore,
the court concluded that due to the insurance company's past policy language, it was
"apparent they knew how to limit coverage to the scope of permission granted." Id. at 10.
'
90 McKenzie & Johnson, supra note 10, at 653.
'9' American Select Ins. Co. v. Bates, No. 1381, 1987 WL 28946, at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 17, 1987). See also Bowen v. Price, No. 83AP-541, 1984 WL 5906, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1984) (stating that the scope of permission is not the only factor
to consider; other factors include the nature of the use and driver's age and education).
But see Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Babcock, No. L-87-035, 1988 WL 39730, *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 29, 1988) (focusing solely on the extent of permission given by the owner of
the vehicle).
192 498 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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was given the vehicle, and "did not have a 'reasonable belief' that he was
entitled to drive [the] vehicle to the beach."'93 Likewise, in Johnson v.
Blue Ridge Insurance Co.,'94 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a
second permittee "exceeded the scope of permission given by [the
insured] ... thus excluding coverage for the incident" when she
borrowed insured's vehicle to search for a job, and thereafter allowed a
twelve-year-old to drive the car.'95 In Lightning Rod Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Ray,'96 where an employee took a camp vehicle to get gasoline,
yet went ten miles past the gas station to "Hell's Hollow" and drove the
vehicle off of a cliff,'97 the Ohio Court of Appeals held that "his detour
negated any possibility he might have been entitled to use the vehicle
,,198
However, in other cases courts seem to take the position that unless
specific restrictions are placed on the driver, coverage is afforded
regardless of a general deviation.'99 For example, in Massachusetts Bay
Insurance Co. v American States Insurance Co.,2"' the insured's
girlfriend had borrowed the insured's truck on different occasions to run
errands in the neighborhood.2"' On the day of the accident, she bor-
rowed the insured's truck for the purpose of running errands and said
"she would be right back."2 2 However, driver went "to a party and
then to a bar [twenty-five] miles from her stated destination.""2 3 Al-
though the driver exceeded the scope of her entitlement to use the
vehicle, one Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that
the driver had a reasonable belief that she was entitled to operate the
insured's vehicle, based on the fact that the insured did not set any limits
on his girlfriend's use of the vehicle that particular night.0 4
By the same token, if specific limits are set, the driver will be
excluded if he deviates from those limits.05 An example is Donegal
93 Id. at 1039.
194 376 S.E.2d 703 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
'
95 Id. at 704.
96 No. 91-L-073, 1992 WL 192457 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 1992).
197 Id. at *1.
198 Id. at *6.
'
99 See infra notes 200-04.200 No. 12955, 1987 WL 13651 (Ohio Ct. App. June 17, 1987).
201 Id. at *1.
202 Id. at *3.
203 Id. at *1.
204Id. at *3.
205 See infra notes 206-14. But see United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Lail, 385 S.E.2d
424 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) where the insured placed express restrictions on the driver
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Mutual Insurance Co. v Eyler,"6 where the insured's brother was only
allowed to operate the insured's vehicle for the purpose of going to work.
The brother could not operate the vehicle past midnight, and he could not
drive the vehicle under the influence of alcohol." 7 Nevertheless, the
insured's brother took the vehicle and was consuming alcohol on the way
to a friend's house at 2:00 a.m. when he was involved in an accident.0
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the insured's brother fell
into the exclusion of someone using the vehicle without a reasonable
belief that he was entitled to do so, and thus was denied coverage.20 9
In American Select Insurance Co. v. Bates,211 the insured's son-in-
law asked permission to take the insured's vehicle to purchase a car part.
The insured specifically told him to "bring the car right back."''
Thereafter, the insured's son-in-law drove the car from the insured's
residence forty-five miles to Columbus, Ohio and was involved in an
accident. 2  The Ohio Court of Appeals stated that "the extent of
permission granted to the user is one of the factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of his belief" '213 and found that the
insured's son-in-law's "departure was so complete that a reasonable
person could not believe his use was still permissive." 4
E. Reasonable Belief Encompasses a Variety of Factors, Including
Permission
As stated previously, the entitlement exclusion clause replaced the
traditional omnibus clause language in response to the substantial amount
of litigation occurring under the permission approach. 21 5 Therefore, it
is clear that permission is no longer the crucial factor in determining
regarding the exact time and route to drive the vehicle. Id. at 425. When the accident
happened on a different route, insurer denied coverage under the entitlement exclusion
clause. Id. Although specific instructions were given to the driver, the court held that
deviation from exact route did not exclude driver from coverage. Id. at 425-26.
206 519 A.2d 1005 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
207 Id. at 1009.
208 id.
2 9 Id. at 1010.210 No. 1381, 1987 WL 28946 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1987).
211.1d. at *1.
212 Id.
213 Id. at *2.
214 Id. at *3.215 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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coverage. 216 It may be a factor in determining coverage,217 but to
focus on permission alone is to blatantly ignore the terms of the insurance
policy.
The following diagram demonstrates concisely why focusing on
permission alone is an incorrect analysis:
As one can see, reasonable belief is broader in scope than permis-
sion,21 and in fact completely encompasses the permission approach.
More specifically, under the permission approach, coverage exists only
with the express or implied permission of the owner.21 9 However, under
a reasonable belief analysis, one can have a reasonable belief of
entitlement to operate insured's vehicle if the user has the express or
implied permission of the owner and in situations where other factors
indicate that a reasonable belief exists even without the owner's permis-
sion.220
216 See W. Shelby McKenzie & H. Alston Johnson, Insurance Law 47 LA. L. REV.
511, 515 (1987) (noting that the Personal Auto Policy, which was drafted by the
Insurance Services Office, "has removed any permission requirement from the definition
of insured and instead has inserted an exclusion").217 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
218 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
219 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 133-220 and accompanying text.
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H. CAN UNLICENSED AND INTOXICATED
DRIVERS HAVE A REASONABLE BELIEF?
A. Unlicensed Drivers
Because there are statutory mandates in every jurisdiction that one
must be licensed to operate a motor vehicle,22 it would seem to be
logical that an unlicensed driver is not entitled to operate a motor vehicle,
irrespective of any reasonable belief that she is entitled to do so.
However, some courts have found the entitlement exclusion clause to be
ambiguous as it applies to unlicensed drivers. As the court in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v Moore222 explained:
A provision of a contract of insurance is ambiguous if... reasonably
intelligent persons would differ regarding its meaning .... That is, for
a person to reasonably believe that he is entitled to use a car a person
must have the owner's permission and a valid driver's license. However
the clause could also be interpreted to mean that a person can reason-
ably believe he is entitled to use a car once he has obtained the owner's
permission."2
Some courts state that unlicensed drivers are not entitled to operate
a motor vehicle regardless of any reasonable belief of entitlement to do
so. For example, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated in Safeway
Insurance Co. v Jones that the entitlement exclusion focuses on the "state
of mind of the person using the vehicle,"224 and that "an unlicensed
driver... could not have 'reasonably' believed that he was entitled to
drive the insured vehicle or any other vehicle, regardless of whether he
had ... permission to do so." '225 In Rogers v. Travelers Indemnity
Co.,226 the court granted summary judgment for the insurer stating that
' See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 186.410 (Baldwin 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4507.02 (Anderson 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625, para. 5/6-101 (Smith-Hurd 1990).
222 544 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). In this case, the court found the word
"entitled" ambiguous and gave coverage to unlicensed driver who had been given
permission to operate insured's vehicle by insured's daughter.
SId.
2 Safeway Ins. Co. v. Jones, 415 S.E.2d 19, 20 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Georgia
Farm v. Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 350 S.E.2d 325 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)).
' Id. at 19, 20. See also Miller v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co., 450 S.E.2d 432, 435
(Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that a driver with a learner's permit could not have had a
reasonable belief "[a]s a matter of law").
226 413 S.E.2d 254 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
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an unlicensed driver could not have reasonably ascertained that he was
entitled to operate said vehicle since a learner's permit does not permit
one to drive any vehicle on public highways without the supervision of
a licensed adult.227
However, regardless of the fact that one is required to have an
operator's license to legally operate a motor vehicle, the majority of
jurisdictions appear to focus on the user's reasonable belief of entitlement
to operate a particular motor vehicle, and not whether the user was
licensed to drive. For example, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,228 the court defined the issue of
whether an unlicensed driver could have a reasonable belief of entitle-
ment to operate a motor vehicle as follows:
The question under the policy is not one of legality - whether the
operator had legal permission of the owner, or legal permission from the
state in the form of a valid driver's license; rather; it is a question of
fact - did the operator have a reasonable belief that, at the time of the
accident, he was entitled to drive the vehicle?2.9
Therefore, in most courts, the fact that the driver is unlicensed will
not by itself negate any possibility that the unlicensed driver may have
a reasonable belief that he is entitled to operate the vehicle. In fact, there
are many other factors that courts consider in analyzing an unlicensed
driver's reasonable belief.2"' As discussed in Part I,231 if the unli-
censed driver is a family member, he may be covered by his family
member status, regardless of the fact that he is unlicensed.23 2 Another
227 1d. at 255.
228 392 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 1990).
229 id.
2 o See Fisher v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 586 A.2d 783, 791 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1991) (stating that whether the driver of the vehicle is licensed is irrelevant
under the entitlement clause; the sole focus is whether the driver had a reasonable belief
that he was entitled to operate the vehicle); Blount v. Kennard, 612 N.E.2d 1268, 1270
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ("In determining whether ... [driver] had a 'reasonable be-
lief' under the policy language in this case, the trial court had to consider subjective and
objective factors, including the extent of permission granted.").
z' See infra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
2 2 See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 564 N.E.2d 906 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (providing
coverage to an unlicensed son because of his family member status); American States Ins.
v. Adair Indus., Inc., 576 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (providing coverage to
insured's unlicensed brother because of his family member status); State Auto. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Ellis, 700 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (providing coverage to an unlicensed
fourteen year old daughter because of her family member status); Paychex, Inc. v.
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factor which carries a significant amount of weight in the majority of
jurisdictions is whether the unlicensed driver had express permission from
the insured to operate the vehicle. For example, in Cincinnati Casualty
Co. v Rickard,233 the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the unlicensed
driver was reasonable in believing she was entitled to operate the vehicle
based on express permission from the insured, "subject to whatever
penalty the law might impose if she was discovered to be driving under
[a suspended license]., 23 4 Similarly, in Canadian Indemnity Co. v.
Heftin, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that an unlicensed driver with
insured's permission to drive the car was not subject to the exclusion for
using the vehicle without a reasonable belief he was entitled to do so.
235
Another case where the unlicensed driver had express permission
from the insured to operate the vehicle is Safeway Insurance Co. v
Holmes. 236 In that case, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that the
statute prohibiting a fifteen-year-old from driving without a licensed adult
in the car "relates to the manner of defendant Holmes' use of the vehicle
and does not abrogate the fact that she had received permission for the
use of the [car] from an apparently appropriate source."237
Yet, courts may be a little more reluctant to provide coverage to an
unlicensed driver if the permission were not granted expressly by the
insured, but from an authorized user. In Cooper v. State Farm Automobile
Insurance Co.,38 a fourteen-year-old unlicensed driver obtained permis-
sion from insured's son to operate a vehicle. The court held that "under
North Carolina law one need not necessarily show he had a legal right to
drive to establish a reasonable belief of entitlement., 23 9 The issue of
reasonable belief was held to be a factual question for the jury.240
Likewise, in Broz v. Jinland,24' the Supreme Court of Ohio held the
issue of whether an unlicensed driver with permission from a permittee,
not the insured, could have a reasonable belief of entitlement to use the
Covenant Ins. Co., 549 N.Y.S.2d 237 (App. Div. 1989) (providing coverage to an
unlicensed son because of his family member status); Preston v. Tromm, No. 9-88-31,
1990 WL 61748 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1990) (providing coverage to an unlicensed son
because of his family member status).
23 No. CA-726, 1990 WL 166480 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1990).
214 Id. at *3.
2" 727 P.2d 35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
-6 390 S.E.2d 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
237 1d. at 54-55.
238 849 F.2d 496 (11th Cir. 1988).
239 Id. at 498.240 Id.
241 629 N.E.2d 395 (Ohio 1994).
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vehicle to be a jury question."' On the other hand, where an unlicensed
driver is expressly prohibited by a named insured from operating his
motor vehicle, this will be a significant factor in denying coverage.243
B. Intoxicated Drivers
Every state has passed laws forbidding the operation of a motor
vehicle while intoxicated.2 " Therefore, it could be logically inferred
that an intoxicated driver could not be entitled to operate any motor
vehicle regardless of any reasonable belief. However, most courts have
not adopted a per se rule that an intoxicated driver can never have a
reasonable belief that she is entitled to operate a motor vehicle.
In Plowman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,245 an employee, at the
direction of his employer, drove to his nephew's house in a vehicle
owned by the insured-employer to inquire about a job.246 Employee-
driver was drinking beer upon arrival at his nephew's house, and
continued to drink for four more hours. 247 About forty minutes after
employee driver left his nephew's house, he was involved in a fatal car
accident.24' The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
insurance company, stating that the employee driver fell within the
exclusion of the insurance policy because he operated the insured's motor
vehicle without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so.249
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed, stating that
whether the driver had a reasonable belief was a jury question, because
it was "unclear from the record whether he [driver] had been specifically
instructed at any time.., not to drink while driving.""25
Although the Plowman court believed it to be unclear whether the
intoxicated driver in that case had a reasonable belief that he was entitled
242 Id. at 398-99.
243 See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Plummer, 444 S.E.2d 378, 381 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994); Newell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 432 S.E.2d 284, 286 (N.C. 1993); Omaha
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 866 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), where in each
case the court denied coverage to insured's unlicensed child who had been expressly
prohibited to operate the insured's vehicle.
2
'See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010 (Baldwin 1991); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 4511.19 (Anderson 1994); N.Y. VEH. & TRAFFIC LAW § 1192 (McKinney 1992).
245 623 So. 2d 1103 (Ala. 1993).246 Id. at 1104.
247 id.
248 id.
249 Id.
25
°Id. at 1105.
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to use the motor vehicle, in some cases it is very clear that the intoxicat-
ed driver could not have had such a reasonable belief. For example, in
Buckeye Union Insurance Co. v. Lawmnce,251 an intoxicated driver
forced an authorized user out of the driver's seat and drove the insured's
vehicle ninety-five miles per hour with a "[twelve] pack beneath his
legs." '252 Unsurprisingly, this action ended in an accident. The court, in
denying coverage, stated: "The subject [of reasonable belief] most
probably was no part of his mental processes at that time." '253 Similarly,
in Allstate Insurance Co. v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,254
the driver took a vehicle owned by his friend's father in the middle of the
night and consumed "three, four or five beers." '255 Based on these facts,
the court "wonder[ed] if [the driver] had 'any belief' at all at the
time. 25
6
In Samples v. Southern Guaranty Insurance Co.,257 driver was at
the insured's home drinking alcohol, "bec[ame] highly intoxicated," and
apparently passed out.258 The next morning, without the insured's
knowledge, he "drove away in [a friend's] car rather than his own. 259
This incident ended in a collision, as well as a charge of driving under
the influence and theft.26' Based upon these circumstances, the court
held that the driver could not have had a reasonable belief that he was
entitled to use the insured's vehicle.261
Unfortunately, most cases do not present factual situations which are
clear to the court, and thus intoxication plays only a minor role in
determining whether reasonable belief exists. In fact, it seems to be the
majority rule that the intoxication of the driver is only one factor to be
-' 590 N.E.2d 406 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
212 Id. at 408.
'53 Id. at 409.
5 663 F. Supp. 548 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
255 Id. at 551. Apparently, the driver and his friends had been drinking throughout the
course of the evening, but the driver only admitted drinking three to five beers. The judge
in this case noted that this estimate "is more liberal than most. Most witnesses, under the
circumstances, never seem to drink more than two beers." Id. at 551 n.1.
16 Id. at 554. But see United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Continental Ins. Co., 1985 WL
4692 (Tenn. Ct. App.) (finding that driver had a reasonable belief that he was entitled to
operate insured's vehicle despite the fact that the driver took the vehicle of his friend's
father and consumed several beers).
... 398 S.E.2d 220 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
28 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 221.
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taken into consideration by the courts in determining whether the driver
has a reasonable belief of entitlement to operate a vehicle. 62
C. Illegal Activity is Not Reasonable
Since an operator's license is required to operate a motor vehicle in
every state, and since it is against the law in every state to operate a
motor vehicle while intoxicated, it is this author's contention that the
majority rule, that unlicensed and intoxicated drivers may have a
reasonable belief of entitlement to operate an automobile, is illogical. As
the dissent of State Farm v Moore263 stated, with regard to unlicensed
drivers:
[To think himself] 'entitled'. . . simply by virtue of being handed the
keys, that conclusion involves more wishful thinking than reasonable-
ness. Such judgment as it demonstrates is neither sound nor rational
since it endows the... owner of an automobile with the authority to
permit an activity, driving without a license, [or driving while intoxicat-
ed], which the state clearly and specifically forbids.2 4
This argument holds equally true for intoxicated drivers.
As illogical as it may seem, courts apparently have justified this on
the ground that even if the unlicensed or intoxicated driver were denied
insurance, they would not be deterred from the consequences of their
acts.26 In fact, it has been said that if unlicensed or intoxicated drivers
were susceptible to deterrence to begin with, "they would be unlikely to
illegally take the wheel 266 since "such drivers are financially irrespon-
sible virtually by definition.,
267
However, there are major flaws in this argument. Under this rationale,
even thieves should be provided coverage since, if they were susceptible
to deterrence, they would not "illegally take the wheel. 268 Moreover,
262 See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
263 544 A.2d 1017 (Pa. Super Ct. 1988).
2
" d. at 1022 (Montemuro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26S See Principal Casualty Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 1306,
1309 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).266 Id. Although in this case the insurance policy in question contained the traditional
omnibus clause, it is relevant due to the fact that it seems to give a rationale behind this
theory.
.
267Id. at 1309.
268 Id. at 1308.
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providing coverage to unreasonable drivers may have been justifiable
under the traditional permissive use clause, focusing on whether the
owner gave the driver permission,2 69 but it is not justifiable under the
entitlement exclusion clause. The entitlement exclusion clause excludes
coverage for "any person... [u]sing the vehicle without a reasonable
belief that that person is entitled to do so."27' For such belief to be
reasonable, this "implies the exercise of sound judgment.""27 The issue
thus becomes whether a driver can be said to be exercising "sound
judgment" '272 while breaking the law. Framed in this way, it seems
obvious that the definition of "sound judgment" should not include the
decision to break the law.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the following illustration will help to clarify how courts have
dealt with the entitlement exclusion:
Picture the court inviting a representative of the insurance
companies for a long walk down a winding road. "'Follow me, I will not
lead you astray, " the court says. The court leads the representative
down this winding road, passing many signs along the way illustrating
all the changes the permissive clause has went through.
The first sign they pass is on a very narrow road and is labeled
'permission. " The insurance company turns to the court and says
"Don 't you want me to stop here? Isn't it important that the owner give
the user permission to use the vehicle?" The court replies, "No, we've
tried that approach for years, and it has only led to confusion and
needless litigation causing insurance rates to rise! Moreover, it is too
narrow. " The insurance company, respectful of the wisdom of the court,
continues to follow its lead.
After many miles of signs illustrating the changes in the permissive
use clause, the court finally stops at a sign on a broad road labeled
"reasonable belief of entitlement. " The insurance company turns to the
court and says, "Exactly! I've figured it out! If we focus on the mind of
the user and not the owner, this will allow broad coverage and put an
end to this litigation. " The court smiles and disappears.
269 See supra notes 6-17 and accompanying text.
270 See KIT, supra note 1, at 2A8.
171 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 544 A.2d 1017, 1022 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (Montemuro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).272id.
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On the walk home, the insurance company is astounded to find
there are still many judges standing at all of the signs he had previously
passed. Some were standing at the "reasonable belief of entitlement"
sign itself looking confused and bewildered, and some walked right past
the sign. Nevertheless, the insurance company trusted the court's
wisdom and changed the policy language. Yet, still the insurance
company wondered if the walk had been all for naught, and whether,
perhaps, it was a "dead end."
Maybe the walk has not been "all for naught" and the road represent-
ing this change is, therefore, not a "dead end." But have the insurance
companies been led astray? Indeed. This entitlement exclusion clause was
added as an affirmative step on the part of insurance companies for the
specific purpose of broadening coverage to eliminate the problems courts
encountered under the previous permissive use language." 3 However,
as the story illustrates, although the insurance companies added this
language to follow the courts' lead, they have been led astray because
there are still many judges who are either confused by this language and
use rules of construction to stretch the policy language beyond "reason-
able belief," or are ignoring it entirely by focusing solely on permis-
sion.
As with any contract interpretation issue, there are many rules of
construction which provide the courts with tools for interpreting insurance
contracts. 4 Although courts will cite to the general rule of construction
that "[a]n insurance policy, like any other contract, must be interpreted
according to its plain language and express terms,"27 they will use
other rules of construction to reach whatever outcome they feel is just
under the circumstances. For example, courts tend to look at the
reasonable expectations of the insured with regard to the terms of the
273 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
274 "The provisions of an insurance contract are subject to the same rules of
interpretation and construction as are other contract terms." American States Ins. Co. v.
Adair Indus., Inc. 576 N.E.2d 1272,1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Sharp v. Indiana
Union Mut. Ins. Co., 526 N.E.2d 237, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)).271 See Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 350 S.E.2d
325, 326 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Grange Mut. Casualty Co. v. King, 331 S.E.2d 41
(Ga. Ct. App. 1985)); see also Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kubik, 492 N.E.2d 504,
506 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (citing Zipf v. Allstate Ins. Co., 369 N.E.2d 252 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977)) ("Where the terms of a policy are clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning will
be given effect.").
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insurance policy.276 Yet these reasonable expectations are expanded
beyond any possible actual reasonable belief.277
In addition, it appears that courts are analyzing the insured's
reasonable expectations at the time of the accident, not at the time of the
execution of the insurance contract. Of course, at the time of the accident,
the insured's expectations are clearly different. For example, at the time
of execution, an insured would not reasonably expect coverage if her
unlicensed son took insured's vehicle in the middle of the night,
consumed alcoholic beverages, and was involved in an automobile
accident. Yet, at the time of the accident, the insured may expect
coverage.
It is this author's position, and the position stated by some courts,
that if the doctrine of reasonable expectations must come into play, courts
"should examine the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts
and circumstances of the parties at the time of execution."27
As many courts have stated:
A court cannot and should not do violence to the plain terms of a[n]
[insurance] contract by artificially creating ambiguity where none exists.
In situations in which a reasonable interpretation favors the insurer and
any other interpretation would be strained and tenuous, no compulsion
exists to torture or twist the language of the contract.279
276 "The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study
of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations." Preston v. Tromm, No.
9-88-31, 1990 WL 61748, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1990).
277 For example, in United States Auto. Ass'n v. Continental Ins. Co., 1985 WL 4692,
*5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1985), the court allowed coverage despite the facts driver,
insured's son's friend, took the automobile without permission and was intoxicated. In
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 768 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), the
court allowed coverage despite the fact the employee driver had taken the employer's van
without permission on a two day drinking spree which ended in a five car collision. Could
the insured reasonable expect coverage in these situations? If the doctrine of reasonable
expectations must come into play, reasonable expectations should be limited in scope to
what the true expectations were under the terms of the policy, not to encompass any
possible circumstance the insured could have contemplated.
278 General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Perry, 541 A.2d 1340, 1342 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (citing Pacific Indem. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty, 488 A.2d 486
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)).
279 Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Miller, 202 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Fresno Economy Import Used Cars, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 142
Cal. Rptr. 681 (Ct. App. 1977)). This case involved a transfer of title issue wherein the
new owner claimed coverage should be provided to him as a permissive user under
seller's policy. The court held that the new owner was excluded from coverage under the
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To add to this torture and twisting of the policy language, some courts
are ignoring the policy language entirely.8 As illustrated in the above
story, in the long winding walk the insurance industry has been through
with the permissive use clause, some courts are presuming that the rule
is still that of permission.
Yet, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said, "[t]his is not a matter of
polite presumptions; we must look the facts in the face."28' The facts
which courts must look to in analyzing the entitlement exclusion clause
are as follows: First, the entitlement exclusion was added in response to
the litigation, to broaden coverage and thereby reduce litigation, and
should be read as such. 82 Second, the language is plain and unambigu-
ous. "Any person" means just that - any person."83 Third, reasonable
belief is broad and encompasses both express and implied permission,
along with other circumstances, but does not encompass every possible
circumstance that courts can contemplate. 84 Finally, to be entitled to
operate a motor vehicle under the policy, one must be in compliance with
applicable motor laws. 5
These "facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored. 28
6
Recognizing them will serve to benefit society as a whole. Coverage can
be broadened and litigation reduced, and society as a whole will benefit
from being able to receive reasonable insurance premiums. When
substantial litigation occurs over the interpretation of insurance policy
provisions, the costs of such litigation are unfortunately passed on to the
purchasers of insurance by increasing the cost of premiums. Keeping
litigation costs down allows insurance companies to pass the savings
along to the public.
Therefore, although it is unfortunate that in some situations coverage
will not be provided if the driver falls within the entitlement exclusion,
the costs will be outweighed by the benefits to society as a whole.
Darla L. Keen
entitlement exclusion clause in seller's policy. Id. at 872.28 Seesupranotes 36-58 and accompanying text (explaining how courts are ignoring
the entitlement exclusion as it applies to family members); supra notes 147-52 (showing
how courts are focusing on permission and ignoring the reasonable belief language).
281 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915).
282 See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
283 See Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 350 S.E.2d
325, 326 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); supra notes 60-90, 119-32 and accompanying text.284 See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
285 See supra notes 263-72 and accompanying text.
286 Aldous Huxley, A Note on Dogma, in PROPER STUDIES 192, 205 (1927).
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